Selection Bias and the Underwriter Certification of the Largest Shareholders in Seasoned Equity Offerings

Lee, Chin Chong and Poon, Wai Ching and Sinnakkannu, Jothee (2017) Selection Bias and the Underwriter Certification of the Largest Shareholders in Seasoned Equity Offerings. International Review Of Finance. pp. 1-36.

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Abstract

The largest shareholders of issuing firms in Hong Kong are eligible to underwrite rights issues and open offers. We hypothesize that the largest shareholders as underwriters who possess more information are better than investment banks in certifying firm value. Our analyses show that the largest shareholders self-select into their preferred issuing firms, and a selection bias in the choice of underwriters arises. After controlling for firm and issue characteristics and addressing the selection bias, our findings support our hypothesis. We also find that investment banks with greater access to information through prior underwriting relationship provide better certification than investment banks without such relationship.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Academic Affairs
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email masilah.mansor@newinti.edu.my
Date Deposited: 19 Oct 2018 09:23
Last Modified: 19 Oct 2018 09:23
URI: http://eprints.intimal.edu.my/id/eprint/1198

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