Why Peace Agreements Fail: Institutions and Power in the Bangsamoro

Abstract

Why do ostensibly comprehensive peace agreements fail to become self-enforcing? This paper explains the fragility of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) through Acemoglu’s critique of the Political Coase Theorem (PCT): in post-conflict settings, institutions remain endogenous to power and credible external enforcement is scarce. Using a structured-focused comparison and process tracing, the paper analyzes two Bangsamoro “stress tests” between 2023 and 2025 (1) institutional manipulation around leadership and election timing, and (2) credibility shocks in the normalization track—against four comparative cases (Northern Ireland, Aceh, Colombia, Sudan). Recent events include the Supreme Court of the Philippines’ 2025 ruling voiding two BARMM redistricting laws and ordering the first parliamentary election no later than 31 March 2026, and the MILF Central Committee’s suspension of Phase 4 decommissioning in July–August 2025 over delayed socio-economic delivery. Where external anchors and third-party monitoring were strong (Good Friday Agreement; Aceh’s AMM), bargains hardened into rules. Where they were weak (Colombia; Sudan), elites reshaped institutions and diluted commitments. The Bangsamoro trajectory currently resembles the latter. The paper contributes (i) a test of Acemoglu’s critique in Southeast Asia; (ii) an operational approach to measuring “institutional insulation” and “commitment credibility”; and (iii) concrete policy mechanisms that link aid and recognition to verifiable milestones in elections and normalization. Without insulation and external enforcement, CAB remains a fragile equilibrium rather than a self-sustaining peace.